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STATE OF NEW YORK
SUPREME COURT

COUNTY OF ALBANY

In The Matter of SPYRO GERMENIS,
Petitioner,
-againstNEW YORK STATE DIVISION OF PAROLE,
Respondent,
For A Judgment Pursuant to Article 78
nf the Civil Practice Law and Rules.

Supreme Court Albany County Article 78 Term
Hon. George B. Ceresia, Jr., Supreme Court Justice Presiding
RJI # 0 1-07-ST7464 Index No. 873-07
Appearances:

Spyro Germenis
Inmate No. 83-B- 1433
Petitioner, Pro Se
Woodbourne Correctional Facility
99 Prison Road, P.O. Box 1000
Woodbourne, NY 12788-1000
Andrew M. Cuomo
Attorney General
State of New York
Attorney For Respondent
The Capitol
Albany, New York 12224
(Steven H. Schwartz,
Assistant Attorney General
of Counsel)

DECISION/ORDER/JUDGMENT

George B. Ceresia, Jr., Justice
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The petitioner, an inmate at Woodbourne Correctional Facility, has commenced the
instant CPLR Article 78 proceeding to review a determination of respondent dated
September 6, 2005 to deny petitioner discretionary release on parole. Petitioner is serving
a ic'rm of fiftc.cn years to life on a conviction of murdcr sccond dcgrcc involving the dciith

of his girlfriend. Among the many arguments set forth in the petition, the petitioner points
out that this was his fifth appearance before the Parole Board. The petitioner attributes his
crime to consumption of an illegal drug, lysergic acid diethyl amide (LSD). He indicates that
he received a certificate in ministry from the New York State Theological Seminary.
According to the petitioner, he was instrumental in establishing a ministry of the Greek
Orthodox Church in the New York State prison system. He avers that he has completed three
hundred hours of substance abuse therapy and aggression replacement therapy. He has been
a facilitator for the aggression replacement therapy program. He has been a trainer and
facilitator for the alternatives to violence program. He underwent eighty hours of training
as inmate program associate. He was granted an outside work pass and worked in the
administration building at Woodbourne Correctional Facility. He has received three
superintendent's commendations. He maintains that he has had an exemplary disciplinary
record while in prison, and that he has never been disciplined for a violent act. He has
received a number of letters of recommendation, some from prominent members of the
community.
The petitioner asserts that the Parole Board relied upon incorrect information in the
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pre-sentence report. He argues that the decision of the Parole Board is, in his words, “bare
and conclusory”, and in violation of Executive Law 5 2594. In his view, the Parole Board,

in rendering its determination, failed to articulate which factor or factors were found to be

criticizes the Parole Board for violating his rights to equal protection and due process.
The reasons for the respondent’s determination to deny petitioner release on parole
are set forth as follows:
“Upon a review of the record, personal interview and due
deliberation, it is the determination of the panel that parole is
denied. You are presently incarcerated upon your conviction of
murder 2nd by plea, wherein you repeatedly stabbed your
girlfriend, causing her death. You then hid her body and, days
later, wrapped her body in plastic, attached a weight and threw
it into the bay. It is noted that this offense is your only crime of
conviction. The panel has considered your programming and
disciplinary record since your last board appearance, including
a Tier I11 and a Tier I1 infraction. Also considered are the
documents submitted on your behalf, including numerous
positive letters of support. Discretionary release must again be
denied. You committed a vicious and violent crime evidencing
a callous disregard for the sanctity of human life. Your brutal
behavior was planned and further aggravated by your
subsequent cover-up efforts. All factors considered, the panel
concludes that you are a continuing risk to public safety and
your continued incarceration is warranted. Release at this time
would deprecate the severity of your conduct, undermine respect
for the law and tend to trivialize the tragic loss of life which you
caused.
”

As stated in Executive Law $259-i (2) (c) (A):
“Discretionary release on parole shall not be granted merely as
a reward for good conduct or efficient performance of duties
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while confined but after considering if there is a reasonable
probability that, if such inmate is released, he will live and
remain at liberty without violating the law, and that his release
is not incompatible with the welfare of society and will not so
deprecate the seriousness of his crime as to undermine respect
for law. In making the parole release decision, the guidelines
;~doplcdpursuant to subdivision four oi’section two hundrcd
fifty-nine-c of this article shall require that the following be
considered: (i) the institutional record including program goals
and accomplishments, academic achievements, vocational
education, training or work assignments, therapy and
interpersonal relationships with staff and inmates; (ii)
performance, if any, as a participant in a temporary release
program; (iii) release plans including community resources,
employment, education and training and support services
available to the inmate; (iv) any deportation order issued by the
federal government against the inmate [I; (v) any statement
made to the board by the crime victim or the victim’s
representative [I” (Executive Law 52594 [2] [c] [A]).
“Parole Release decisions are discretionary and, if made pursuant to statutory
requirements, not reviewable” (Matter of Sinopoli v New York State Board of Parole, 189
AD2d 960,960 [3rd Dept., 19931, citing Matter of McKee v. New York State Bd. of Parole,
157 AD2d 944). If the parole board’s decision is made in accordance with the statutory
requirements, the board’s determination is not subject to judicial review

(y?g Rifik31~v .

Hammock, 103 AD2d 944 [3rd Dept., 19841). Furthermore, only a “showing of irrationality
bordering on impropriety” on the part of the Parole Board has been found to necessitate
judicial intervention

(see

Matter of Silmon v Travis, 95 NY2d 470, 476 [2000], quoting

Matter of Russo v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 50 NY2d 69,77 [ 19801). In the absence

of the above, there is no basis upon which to disturb the discretionary determination made
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by the Parole Board (E

Matter of Perez v. New York State of Division of Parole, 294

AD2d 726 [3rd Dept., 20021).
The Court finds that the Parole Board considered the relevant criteria in making its
dccision and its determination was supported by the record. A wvicw of the [rmscxiptofthe
parole interview reveals that, in addition to the instant offense, attention was paid to such
factors as petitioner's institutional programming, his disciplinary record, and letters
submitted on his behalf. The Parole Board afforded the petitioner an opportunity to speak
in favor of his release. The parole decision was sufficiently detailed to inform the petitioner
of the reasons for the denial of parole and it satisfied the requirements of Executive Law

$2594 (=Matter of Whitehead v. Russi, 201 AD2d 825 [3rd Dept., 19941; Matter of Green

v. New York State Division of Parole, 199 AD2d 677 [3rd Dept., 19931). It is proper, and
in fact required, that the Parole Board consider the seriousness of the inmate's crime and its
violent nature (seeMatter of Weir v. New York State Division of Parole, 205 AD2d 906,907
[3rd Dept., 19941; Maper of Sinopoli v. New York State Board of Parole, 189 AD2d 960,
supra; Matter of Dudley v Travis, 227 AD2d 863, [3rd Dept., 1996). The Parole Board i 7 not
required to enumerate or give equal weight to each factor that it considered in determining
the inmate's application, or to expressly discuss each one (seeMatter of Farid v Travis, supra;
Matter of Moore v New York State Bd. of Parole, 233 AD2d 653 [3rd Dept., 19961; Matter
of Collado v New York State Division ofparole, 287 AD2d 92 1 [3rd Dept., 200 11). Nor must
the Parole Board recite the precise statutory language set forth in the first sentence of
5
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Executive Law $ 2594 (2) (c) (A)
Dept., 20061).

(see Matter of Silvero v Dennison, 28 AD3d 859 [3rd

In other words, “[wlhere appropriate the Board may give considerable

weight to, or place particular emphasis on, the circumstances of the crimes for which a
pctilioticr is i~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ;IS
r ~well
~ c as
t - a: petiLioncr’s
~ ~ t ~ ~ l ,crimirial hislur), together with the otlicr

statutory factors, in determining whether the individual ‘will live and remain at liberty
without violating the law,’ whether his or her ‘release is not incompatible with the welfare
of society,’ and whether release will ‘deprecate the seriousness of [the] crime as to
undermine respect for [the] law”’ (Matter of Durio v New York State Division of Parole, 3
AD3d 816 [3rd Dept., 20041, quoting Executive Law $2594 [2] [c] [A], other citations
omitted).
With regard to petitioner’s arguments concerning an alleged violation of his right to
due process, the Court observes that it has been repeatedly held that a constitutionally
protected liberty interest does not arise under Executive Law $ 259-i, since it does not create
an entitlement to, or legitimate expectation of release (see Barna v Travis, 239 F3d 169 [2nd
Cir.,2001];MarvinvGoord,255 F3d40 [2”dCir.,20011, a t p . 4 4 : P a u n e t t c \ ~ ~ I H R m .(516
~.~k
F Supp 1367 [US Dist. Ct., SD NY, 19811; Washington v White, 805 F Supp 191 [SDNY,
19921). The Court, accordingly, finds no due process violation.
With respect to petitioner’s equal protection argument, the Fourteenth Amendment
of the Federal Constitution forbids States from denying to any person within their jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws, but does not prevent the States from making reasonable
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classifications among persons (Western & S.L.I. Co. v Bd. of Equalization, 451 US 648,68

L Ed 2d 5 14, 523 101 S Ct 2070 [ 19811). Where the action under review does not involve
a suspect class or fundamental right, it is not subject to strict judicial scrutiny, but rather is
examined using the rational basis standard to determine if the action violated the equal
protection clause (see,Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v Murnia, 427 US 307,49 L Ed 2d
520,524,96 S Ct 2562 and Maresca v Cuomo, 64 NY2d 242,250). In this instance there is
simply no evidence of either selective or disparate treatment or that the respondent’s
determination was motivated by impermissible considerations (seeGiordano v City of New
York, 274 F3d 740, 75 1 [2ndCir., 20011).
With regard to petitioner’s argument that the Appeals Unit failed to issue a timely
decision, the Court observes that such a failure does not operate to invalidate the underlying
administrative decision. The sole consequence is to permit the petitioner to deem his or her
administrative remedy to be exhausted, and enable the petitioner to immediately seekjudicial
review of the underlying determination (see 9 NYCRR

8 8006.4 [c]; Graham v New York

-~
State Divisipn c\fPaE\e, 269 AD2d 628 [3rdDept, 20001, lv denied 95 NY2d 753: People ex

rel. Tyler v Travis, 269 AD2d 636 [3rdDept., 20001).
The record does not support petitioner’s assertion that the decision was predetermined
consistent with an alleged executive branch policy mandating denial of parole to all violent
felony offenders. The Court, accordingly, finds no merit to the argument

(see Matter of

Lue-Shing. v Pataki, 301 AD2d 827, 828 [3rd Dept., 20031; Matter of Perez v State of New
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York Division of Parole, 294 AD2d 726 [3rd Dept., 20021; Matter of Jones v Travis, 293
AD2d 800,801 [3rd Dept., 20021; Matter of Little v Travis, 15 AD3d 698 [3rd Dept., 20051,
Matter of Wood v Dennison, 25 AD3d 1056 [3rd Dept., 20061).
rI’l~ei-c
is 110requirement that the deliberations

of the l’arole Board be recorded (see

Executive 2594 [ 6 ] ;Matter of Collins v Hammock, 96 AD2d 733 [4thDept., 19831).
With respect to petitioner’s arguments concerning alleged erroneous information in
the presentence report, It is well settled that “a defendant is not permitted to collaterally
attack a presentence report”

(see Matter of Cox v New York State Division of Parole, 11

AD3d 766,767-768 [3rd Dept., 20041, quoting Matter of Salerno v Murphy, 292 AD2d 837,
837-838 [2002], lv denied 98 NY2d 607 [2002], and citing Matter of Sciaraffo v New York
City Dept. of Probation, 248 AD2d 477,477 [ 19981). For this reason, the Court finds that
petitioner’s arguments concerning alleged errors in the presentence report are of no merit.
The Parole Boardls decision to hold petitioner for the maximum period (24 months)
is within the Board‘s discretion and was supported by the record (seeMatter of Tatta v State
ofNew Yqrk-Tj~isjnn PfParqk. 290 AD2d 907 [3rd Dept., 3_0)0’?],BY denied QRMY?d 604).
The Court has reviewed petitioner’s remaining arguments and finds them to be without
merit.
The Court finds the decision of the Parole Board was not irrational, in violation of
lawful procedure, affected by an error of law, irrational or arbitrary and capricious. The
petition must therefore be dismissed.
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Accordingly, it is

ORDERED and ADJUDGED, that the petition be and hereby is dismissed.
This shall constitute the decision, order and judgment of the Court. All papers are
xturnecl to thc. attorney for the respondent who is directed to enter this
Decision/Order/Judgment without notice and to serve petitioner with a copy of this
DecisiodOrder with notice of entry.

I

ENTER

z,

Dated:

June
2007
Troy, New York

Supreme Court Justice
George B. Ceresia, Jr.

Papers Considered:
1.
2.

3.
4.

Order To Show Cause dated February 1,2007, Petition, Supporting Papers
and Exhibits
Respondent’s Answer dated March 15,2007, Supporting Papers and
Exhibits
Verified Reply dated April 3,2007
Respondent’s Letter dated April 10,2007
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